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In the presence of foreign-owned factors of production in the economy, the effect of trade policy 
changes on national welfare needs to take into account the possible redistributive ffect between 
foreign-owned and domestic factors. Therefore, an otherwise welfare-improving trade liberali- 
zation may paradoxically worse3 national welfare. This paper analyzes this important, new area 
of trade theory and establishes the condition under which this paradox of immiserizing trade 
liberalization arises. The analysis is also applicable to analyzing the effects of external tariff 
variation in customs unions, with full internal factor mobility, on member countries’ welfare. 
1. Introdnctioil 
Hn the presence of foreign-owned factors of production in an economy, the 
traditional conclusions regarding the effects of exogenous parametl:ic 
changes or policy changes on national welfare need to be modified. Thus, in 
an open economy, the absence of the usual foreign and domestic distortions 
ii la Bhagwati (1971) and Johnson (1965) will not ensure that an exogenous 
term-of-trade improvement or a policy shift from autarky’ to free trade 
will improve national welfare. 
For example, take the traditional 2 x 2 moue1 of trade theory and assume 
that the importable good is labour-intensive, labour is wholly national, and 
capital is wholly foreign. A shift from autarky to free trade will then, by 
lowering the relative domestic price of the importable good, lower the real 
wage of labour ti la Stolper-Samuelson (1941) and thereby result in national 
*1 nanks are due to the National Science Foundation Grants Nos. SOC77-07188 and SOCi9- 
07541 for financial support of the research underlying thit paper. The comments of John Black, 
Alan Deardorff, Murray Kemp and Alasdair Smith have led to improvements. 
‘The term ‘autarky’ in the present context is taken to m:an the aisence of trade across 
national borders, in conformity with conventional terminology of economic policy discussior :‘. 
More elaboration of this point is provided in section 4 belcw. 
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jmmiserization from the shift to free trade. Free trade therefore worsens 
rather than improves welfare, given the presence of foreign capital in this 
example. 
Bhagwati and Tironi (1978) formulated the original plroblem as relevant to 
analyzing the widespread concerns of Latin American pohcymakers, who 
feared that regional trade liberalization would benefit foreign investors and 
could harm the Latin A..nerican nations themselves in consequence. In 
addressing this particular problem recently for the 2 x 2 model, the 
Bhagwati-Tironi analysis allows the tariff to vary by policy, but assumes that 
each of the two factors of production is wholly foreign or wholly national. 
This latter assumption permits them to adapt readily to their problem the 
well-known results on income distribution by factor class, originating from 
Stolper-Samuelson (1941) and developed in Bhagwati (1959) Johnson (1959, 
1960) and Rao (1971). 
Unfortunately, the real world does not permit us to divide all factors 
exclusively into the national or the foreign category. Capital flows to 
countries that cannot be assumed to have no capital of their own, and 
labour moves into countries tbat surely have native populations. Thus, it is 
necessary i”or this reason alone to examine the problem at hand by 
permitting the factors of production to be both national and foreign, as we 
do presently. 
More importantl.y, while it is clear that a redistributive effect resulting 
from changing goods price-ratio could lead to paradoxical outcomes for 
national welfare, we are able to demonstrate a stronger proposition in this 
paper. Namely, the paradox of national immiserization following improve- 
ment in tne country% external terms of trade will arise if anl! only if the 
redistributive effect against nationals goes so far as to result in the 
dz~rential-trade-pattern phenomenon, as defined below. 
Our geometric analysis, moreover, has the added ad, antktge of using 
familiar trade-geometric techniques to simplify and resolve what appears to 
be a potentially complex problem. Furthermore, although the explicit focus 
of this paper is the national-foreign distinction, the two-group analysis 
presented here applies equally well to a broad !+ectrum of alternative 
domestic distinctions, e.g. those baseti tin race, ethnicity or sex.’ Moreover, 
the analysis is just as readily applicable, as we demonstrate later, to the 
theory of customs u:iioi;s. 
In section 2 we trace thz effects of variation in the goods price-ratio on the 
income accruing to national factors, thus defining their ‘income lira at 
alternative prioe-ratios. In section 3, we relate this perfectly general ‘analysis 
first to exogenolusly-induced changes in external terms of trade, assumirlg free 
‘ThiJs. our general-equilibrium analysis can throw light on the conditions ,,SB,de - which 
Paramcrric changes at the nationa: level may lead to conflicting outcomes for differently- 
endt)wed racial, ethnic, sexual and other differentiated groups within the nation. 
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trade, and therewith discuss the effects on national welfare that would follow 
from such changes. We also relate the analysis next to effects of tariff 
variation on national welfare. Section 4 offers some concluding observations. 
2. National income variations as goods price-ratio is varied 
The first prcblem that we analyze relates to the behavior of the national 
‘income line’ as the prevailing price-ratio for goods is varied. 
The model has two factors of production, K (for capital) and L (for 
labour). The overall factor endowment is I? and e., while the national (i.e. 
domestically-owned) factor endowment is R, and L,. The two traded goods 
are X and Y 
With the usual restrictions on the linear homogeneous production func- 
tions for the two goods, and assuming the a%ence of factor-intensity 
reversals for the rest of our analysis, we can de&a an aggregate production 
possibility curve, T&T; in fig. 1 for the aggregate factor endowments (K, 1.). 
Good Y 
t 
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Fig. 1. 
For the usual trade-theoretic analysis, with well-behaved social utility curves, 
a goods price-ratio AB will be defined for autarky and the utility index UG 
wr)uld rise monotonically as PJP,, (the relative price of X in terms of Y) was 
varied up from A to T: or down from A to T; (with reversed pattern of 
trade). (For simplicity of exposit;on, we assume that all income earned by 
factors from abroad is consumed locally, to avoid having to show re- 
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patriation of such income k-r fig. I.) This relationship between 13,/P, and UG, 
as illustrated in fig. 2, follows from deriving first he implication of the goods 
price-ratio variation for the aggregate budget line and then deducing the 
welfare level (UG) achieved in fig. 1. 
For n~~iona2 welfare, however, we need to define these two steps for 
domestically-owned factors alone. First, as in this section, we must derive the 
national budget line, as defined by the domestic goods price-ratio. Next, as in 













The natural way to proceed with the analysis then would appear to be to 
draw onto fig. 1 the national production possibility curve, T,T,, defined by 
the domestically-owned endowments I?, and E,. One may then be tempted 
to draw the goods price-ratio tangent to it, as to T:T;, and to treat the 
resulting income !:!ne as the national budget line. 
But, except for a range of possible cases, this cannot be done. To see why, 
and to state the correct and complete analysis of the prob’lem, let us turn to 
the familiar Samuelson diagram in fig. 3 - which relates the goods price-ratio 
(P, ;P,x I1 the factorprice (rental-wage) ratio PK/PLl, and the sei;rcral capitai- 
labour ratios K,/& (for good. X:-and KJL, (for good Y). Assume, without 
loss of generality, that R,/E,<X/E, i.e. the forerign-owned endowment is 
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Fig. 3. 
capital intensive (as would be the case i; foreign capital alone had come into 
the country h la Bhagwati and Tironi (1978)). 1 
There are two cases that can arise then: either there is a range of factor 
price-ratios at which incomplete specialization will obtain on horh T,T, and 
TkTi or there is no such range. Fig. 3 illustrates the former, more interesting 
case; the latter, which corresponds incidentally to the Bhagwati-Tironi 
restrictive case, will be analyzed subsequently and related to the former. 
The analysis then must distinguish among three zones of goods price- 
ratios: Zone I, where they lead to incomplete speciahzatior in production for 
both the production possibility curves T,T, and TkT;; Zone II, where 
complete specialization on the capital-intensive good X occurs on TlTi. 
before it does on the national curve T,T,; and Zone 111, where complete 
specialization on the labour-intensive good Y occurs on T,T, before it occurs 
on the aggregate curve T:Tk. Take each, in turn. 
-- 
Zone I. For the aggregate ndowment ratio, K/L, the range of factor price- 
ratios for incomplete specialization is clearly CE (i.e. OC to OE) on the 
vertical axis of fig. 3. For the nati;nal endowment ratio, R,/E,, the range foi’ 
incomplete specialization is DF. I herefore, DE represents along the verticai 
axis the range of factor prices over which both T,T, and TkT;. will show 
incomplete specialization. Consequently, for any goods price-ratio in the 
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range DE (i.e. OD to OE) along the left-hand horizontal axis, it is evident 
that the choice of capital-labour ratios in X and Y will be identicrrl for T,T, 
and for T:T6, and hence there will be a unique set of real factor prices 
(P,jP, *and PJP,. i=x, J) along both of these production possibility curves.3 
Given this uniqueness, ?he value of national income (LmPJPi+Rn.PK’Pir 
i =x, y) can be represented by the goods price-ratio tangent ‘to TxT,, for the 
same rerason that the value of aggregate income (LP,/Pj +RPJPi, i=x, y) is 
representable by the goods price-ratio tangent o T:Ti. Thus, even though T,T, 
is only a hypothetical construct and national factors combine with foreign 
factors to produce at common techniques tbroughout the economy along 
T:T;, we can see immediately that the foregoing procedure for deriving the 
national budget line (by putting the goods price-ratio tangent to T,TJ will be 
valid as long as P,/P, is in the range DE. 




3For ease of identification, fig. 3 is marked, both for P,/PL and for P,,/Px, with identical 
lettering: C, D, E, and F. Thus, the factor price-ratio range DE ::orresponds to the goods price- 
ra:io range DE. Similarly, the poslioning of the letters C, W, E and F on the KJL, and K,/L, 
schedules indicates, as noted in the text, corresponding points of specialization in production on 
T,q and T;T$ Again, the lettering on T,T, and T:T; in fig. 4 will correspond to the lettering in 
fig. 3, to facilitate grasp of the relationship between the two illustrations. 
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Therefore, for this overlapping range (DE) of incomplete specialization, we 
can indeed proceed in fig. 4 to place the goods price-ratio tangent to TXTJ to 
derive the national income line. Resildes, a movement from E to D along T,T, 
and T:T; will imply - given the resulting rise in the wage-rental ratio and 
the condition .&/z, <B/L -‘a rise in the share of aggregate income going to 
domestically-owned factors. 
Zone II. But vary now the goods price-ratio P,,,‘P, down from OE in fig. 3. 
It is evident that there will be complete speci.alization on good X on T:TI, 
while, on T,T,, we would get incomplete E;pecialization in production until 
the goods price-ratio becomes OF (fig. 3). Since the returns to domestically- 
owned factors must reflect what happens on TiT;, however, it follows that 
the relative rewards of K and E will remain fixed at P,/P,= OE in fig. 3 for 
all changes in the goods price-ratio ,from OE to OF anal further. 
Therefore, the share of national in aggregate income will also remain 
constant, for such variations in the goods price-ratio, at OQ/OE. The 
irational income line therefore will become EQ in fig. 4 for the goods price- 
mtio OE in fig. 3 and will shift on its anchor Q thereafter to QS through QR 
as P,/P, falls steadily from OE to zero in lig. 3. 
Clearly, therefore, the stretch EF on T,T, is not relevant to the de- 
termination of the national income line. The diminishing wage-rental ratio 
that it reflects as K,‘L ratios change with a varying goods price-ratio are, in 
fact.. arrested because of the opportunity to combine with the foreign Factors. 
The gain that such an opportunity represents for national factors is 
measured by the distance between: (1) the income line produced by tangency 
of a goods price-ratio along EF in fig. 4; and (2) the parallel income line 
(anchored on Q) that actually obtains, thanks to interaction with the foreign 
factors and the consequent anchoring of the techniques and factor rewards at 
E on TLTI,. 
Zone 111. Varying the goods price-ratio in the opposite direction, from OD 
upwards toward OC and beyond in fig. 3, &en defines the remaining set of 
possible variations in the goods price-ratio. 
At goods price-ratio OD, T,‘T;, shows specialization on good Y and T_kT;. 
shows incomplete specialization, in fig. 4. It’ factor prices were constant as 
PJP, rises, T,T, would have led to continuous improvement in the national 
budget line, each successive budget line being anchored on D and rotating 
upwards. Howeve,r, PK/P, is not fixed, bl;t will continue to fall as the 
aggregate economy moves along T:Ti, from D to C. Therefore, given the 
associated increase in the wage-rental ratir_ and the condition R,.,/Z, <R/J% 
the share of national in aggregate income will rise with the move from D 
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towards C on T:T;. However, the move to C from D is aiso accompani:d by 
a declining intercept of the aggregate income line with the vertical axis. 
Therefore, while the former effect works to raise the national income line, the 
latter effect works to lower it. 
It ii; possible to establish, however, that the combination of these two 
effects yields an unambiguously upward shift in the national income line, 
according to the following reasoning. The real value of national income in 
terms of good Y is given by & =&,PL/Py +R,P,/P,,. By differentiation of this 
equation, d&,/d (PJP,,) = [LJK, + d(P,IP,)/d(P,/P~)jE,. Since the first- 
order conditions for profit maximization can be manipulated easily to show 
that df~K/~,)/d(~L/~,) = - &/$ then dQ,/d(P&) = (E,/‘, ‘- L,,/K$,. 
Thus, dQ,/d(P,/P,)20 because L,/K, 2&,/K, within zone III, with the strict 
equality holding only for the borderline case of goods price-ratio OD. 
Consequently, as PJP, increases continuously with Py/PX (C; la Stolper- 
Samuelson) within zone III, Q,, rises correspondingly, and hence the national 
income line shifts upwards while becoming flatter.4 Once the goods price- 
ratio reaches QC in fig. 4, however, and specialization on good Y ensues at 
Tk for the aggregate conomy, successive increases in P,,/P, will not change 
the share of national in aggregate income and the national income line will 
rotate upwards (along with P,,/P,) from a fixed anchor on the vertical axis in 
ffs. 4. 
What happens in the goods pricp ,-ratio range from OD to OC is that the 
presence of foreign factors introduces diminishing wage-rental ratios, which 
would have been avoided if national factors had operated in isolation (at D 
in fig. 4). At the same time, d la Stolper-Samuelson, an ‘income- 
redistribution’ phenomenon works to labour’s and hence to national advan- 
tage. Apparently, howrIer, the net impact on the national income line is 
unambiguously favourable in the general case for thf: subrange of goods-price 
ratios ODSP,/P,S;OC. For price-ratios in the subrange Py/Px> OC, there is, 
of course, only a favourabie rotation of the national income line as P,/P, 
improves alnd the economy is specialized on good X These two subranges 
together define all the possibilities in zone III. 
In concluding this section, note that the T,T, curve clearly would be of 
little use if E,/z,, were so much below If/L that zone I did not exist.5 In this 
case, we can slee immediately that the situation can be described fully by the 
40f course, dQ,/d(P,/P,)gO also because L,/K, zL,/K,. Except for the borderline case of 
goods price-ratio OD, it is evident that LJK, exceeds both L,fK, and L,/K,, as P,lP, varies 
from D 10 C and therefore both Qy and Q, will improve unambiguously with increase of P,,/P,. 
‘If as in the Bhagwati-Tironi analysis, there is or,ly labour in the national endowmeE:.t, aniv 
cap& is essential for production, T,T, would shlink to the origin! Otherwiz, in their model, it 
would hive a Ricardian shape if capital is dispensable. 
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foregoing analysis of zones II and III. Of course, it is clear that this case, 
where there is no zone I, is implied by the Bhagwati-Tironi analysis where 
capital is wholly foreign and labour is wholly domestic. For, in this case, 
where the Stolper-Samuelson-Bhagwati-Johnson-Rao analysis can be ap- -- 
plied directly, the overall factor endowment ratio is K!L, and the national 
endowment ratio is R,/E, =O. Indeed, in this case, it is evident that the 
national income in units of Y (Q,) and of X (Q,) will unambiguously rise as 
the real wage of labour rises in terms of both Yand X with the rise of PJP,, 
2 la Stolper-Samuelson. 
3. Welfare implications in an open economy 
The preceding analysis can be readily grafted onto two familiar problems 
of ihe theory of trade and welfare: (1) the welfare effects of exogenously- 
ind.:tced changes in the external terms of trade (as a result of some type of 
par’imetric shift abroad) under free trade, and (2) the welfare comparison of 
free trade and autarky. The critical role of the differential-trade-yattern 
phenomenon emerges from our analysis. The discussion holds equally well 
for both the large-country and small-country cases, even though the magni- 
tude of adjustment in the equilibrium value of international prices could 
depend upon the economy’s degree of monopoly power in world trade. 
3.1. Exogenously-induced changes in the terms of trade 
As noted above, in the context of fig. 2, the conventional result, with a 
standard social utility function, is that improvements in the terms of trade 
monothonically improve welfare under free trade, given the pattern of trade. 
This result, however, daes not hold necessarily in the presence of foreign 
factors of production. To see this, consider terms of trade variations within 
the three zones distinguished in section 2 for the general case where zone I 
also obtains. The analysis can be readily extended by the reader to terms of 
trade changes between the Zones. 
3.1.1. Changes within zone I. Within zone I, the domestic price-ratio (which 
is identical to the external terms of trade under f;ee trade) can be put 
tangent to T,T, to derive the national income line, as shown above in section 
2. It follows therefore that terms-of-trad; improvement within zone I ougnt 
to increase national welfare. 
It should be observed, however, that 2 given change in P,jP, may mean 
both an improvement in the terms of trade for the economy as an aggregate 
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and a sinAtaneous terms-of-trade deterioration from the national point of 
view. This apparent paradox is easily see,n and quickly resolved, by noting 
simply that the equilibrium value of P,/P, may differ between aggregate 
autarky (along the actual production possibility curve T:T$ and national 
autarky (along the hypothetical curve TCT,), so that the aggregate (actual) 
pattern of trade may differ from the natronal (hypothetical) pattern of trade. 
For this reason, although natfonal welfare improves monotonically with the 
national terms of trade, aggregate terms-of-trade improvement will not imply 
an increase in national welfare unless the aggregate and national patterns of 
trade happen to be the same. 
This is illustrated in fig. 5, where the T>TI curve has been omitt’ed, to 
avoid cluttering the diagram. The aggregate-aurarky price-ratio (determined 
along the omitted curve TkTL) is drawn tangent to TX??,, at .4’. The national- 
autarky price-ratio is tangent to TXTY at A. (To have ray OA’ steeper than 
ray OA as drawn, a sufficient but not necessary condition is a unique set of 
homothetic indifference curves corresponding to both UG and UN, in view of 
Good Y’ 
\ AUTARK IC 
RATIOS 
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the well-known Rybczymki Theorem) For any reductions in P,/P, from A’, 
Uo would have improved. Howeve:, for all such changes between A’ and A, 
within the autarkic price-ratios cone AOA’, U” obviously declines because 
for national factors the aggregate terms-of-trade improvement is a terms-r,f- 
trade deterioration. Therefore, U” declines steadily from Uz, through U’y to 
U:, However, further declines in PJP, will start improving U” and fig. 5 
shows the PJPx at G which raises U” back lo the level A’ *consistent with 
the aggregate-autarky price-ratio. Obviously, then, still further decline in 
PJP, would have raised U” above the level at A’. 
It follows that the net result of terms-of-trade improvements for the 
aggregate economy may be to raise, lower or leave national welfare 
unchanged. This general result still would hold if ray OA’ were flatter than ray 
OA. Only if the two rays coincided would aggregate terms-of-trade improve- 
ment necessarily imply an increase in national welfare. We have thus shown 
that, in zone I, the paradox of conflicti:>g movements in aggregate and 
national welfare will arise when there is a difference between the national 
and aggregate patterns-of-trade. This dqjk ,ential-trade-patte~r? phenomenon 
will now be discussed in the context of the other two zones. 
3.1.2. Changes within zone II. Within zone II, there is (aggregate) speciali- 
zation on good X along T:T; in fig. 4. It is evident then that any 
improvements in the aggregate terms of trade will in ply corresponding 
improvements in the national terms of trade since both the nation&i and 
aggregate patterns trade will necessarily involve excess supply of good X. 
Successive rotation:; outwards of the national income line, anchored on (2, 
will produce increasing national welfare, U”. Therefore, changes in UG may 
be used to infer the direction of change of U’; there is no complication as in 
zone I, since the d~~~~ential-trade-pattern phenomenon cannot arise here. 
3.1.3. Changes within zone III. Within zone III, however, the possibility of 
diflerential-trade-pattern phenomenon re-emerges. In the aggregate, there is 
first the range of incomplete specialization (up to C from D on TkTi, in fig. 4) 
and then complete specialization on good Y. For variations in the aggrtgate 
terms of trade within the incomplete-specialization range, our earlier analysis 
shows that the national income line must rise with P,/P,. By the same token, 
U” must also rise with PJP,. Thus, when P,/P, rises, U” and UG bill move 
together or in opposite directions according as the economy (in aggregate) 
exports good Y or X respectively. 
However, beyond the point of specialization on good Y the aggregate 
terms-of-trade improvement (resulting from a rise in P,./P,) must also increase 
national income and therefore CT”. The net effect of terms-of-trade improve- 
ments in zone III therefore may be to lower or increase national welfare 
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when there is incomplete specialization along T:T;, but must be to raise 
national welfare when aggregate specialization is complete on good Y 
Note, moreover. that the contrary behaviour of U” and UC’, possible in the 
case of incomplete specialization, does require that the aggregate pattern of 
trade be different from the national pattern of trade: for, such a possibility 
will arise if and only if the aggregate trade pattern involves the export of 
good X6 and the national trade pattern (owing to complete specialization on 
good x necessarily in zone III) involves the export of good Yinstead. 
It is evident therefore that directional changes in national welfare generalty 
cannot be inferred i’rom the direction of changes in the terms of trade in the 
aggregate, if the economy is in zones I and III. Interestingly, for both these 
zones, the paradoxical behaviour of national welfare arises simply because 
the aggregate pattern of trade masks a contrary pattern of trade for the 
domestically-owned. national factors of production. If only we could draw 
aside the veil imposed by the presence of foreign factors, and see directly the 
national (hypothetical) equilibrium production and consumption, the para- 
dox would have disappez red.7 Therefore, we may describe the paradox of 
zones I and III as arising thorn the di~rential-trade-pattern phenomenon. The 
redistribution of income Z la Stolper-Samuelson does indeed take place in 
both zones I and JII; b!,t it might not be sufficiently strong to create the 
paradox of deterifjration (improvement) in national welfare when the 
economy’s terms of trade improve (deteriorate). Sufficient strength, moreover, 
is here synonymous with a difference between the national and aggregate 
patterns Ltf trade. 
3.2. Autarky uersm free trade 
Since neither free trade nor autarky creates tariff revenue, the analysis of 
this paper can be readily used also to ran k these two trade policies in the 
presence of foreign-owned factors of production. 
It is seen immediately that, in zones I and III, the differential-trade-pattern 
phenomenon may arise and thus lead to autarky (in the aggregate) being 
better for national welfare than free trade. (Zone II can be ignored at this 
stage in the discuss&_, since aggregate autarky cannot occur when oniy 
‘?his is, in fact, the paradoxical case considered ,in Bhagwati and Tironi (1978, section II), but 
without the underlying explanation and argumentation G la the national production possibility 
curve, as set out in this paper. 
‘Of course, this does not mean that the paradox cannot arise if national and foreign tastes are 
homothetic. For, it is the difference in the trade i;attern, as determined by the production and 
consumption chotces at the specified goods price-ratio, that is the critical variable in creating the 
paradox in both zones. Mor should the reader forget that the hypothetical national equilibrium 
production will reflect, in zone III (as also zone II, fx that matter), the interaction with foreign 
factors: the national inc,>me line cannot simply be #drawn by reference to T,7;. alone by tangency 
of the goods price-ratio with it. In zone I, however, the presence of foreign factors does nothing 
to affect the correctnesc of such a procedure. 
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good X is produced along TLT;, assuming that aggregate consumption is 
always positive for each good.) Thus, the conventional welfare ranking (of 
free trade being superior to autarky) may be reversed, in the presence of 
foreign-owned factors of production within an economy. 
4. Concluding remark 
In conclusion, a few words should be said about the meaning of the term 
‘autarky,’ as used by us in this paper. By general convention in practical 
parlance, autarky refers to the absence of trade across national borders. At 
the same time, evidently ‘autarky’ does not exclude domestic ‘trade’ between 
resident citizens of different countries. The national and foreign, factors in our 
analysis are indeed engaged in domestic trade’, even in the absence of 
international (i.e. trans-border) trade, The analytical problem is therefore 
identical to that which would arise in the case of customs unions. For, once 
a customs union is for.med with common external tariff and free internal 
trade and factor mobility, changes in individual member countries’ welfare as 
external conditions change for the union as a whole are evidently analyzable 
in precisely the same fashion as changes in national welfare in the presence 
of foreign factors of production! 
sThis intra-national trade might be either goods for goods (in zone I where trade in factor 
services is not necessary to equalize marginal products) or goods for factor services (in zones II 
and III where marginal products would otherwise remain unequal). 
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